INTRODUCTION

Yick Wo v. Hopkins
1 has been called "pathbreaking," 2 "leading,"
For all its fame, Yick Wo has disappointed in a way that demands explanation. The United States is a big country with its share of racial concerns; since 1886, a fair judiciary should have applied Yick Wo to invalidate hundreds or thousands of discriminatory prosecutions. 10 However, Professor David Cole stated in 1999 that there are "no reported federal or state cases since 1886 that had dismissed a criminal prosecution on the ground that the prosecutor acted for racial reasons."
11 Other distinguished commentators have made similar observations. 12 The close connection between race and criminal justice makes it impossible to explain Yick Wo's complete lack of progeny by concluding that the Court identified the problem of racially selective prosecution in 1886 and solved it, so it has never bothered us again. A key fact in the case was that none of the Chinese laundrymen who applied for licenses got them; that "the inexorable zero" 13 appeared for a second time in the career of the same case is profoundly puzzling.
One possible explanation looks outside of Yick Wo to the racist justice system: the Court established a good principle that other actors would not enforce. But Yick Wo's desuetude cannot be blamed exclusively on judicial hostility or on the absence of lawyers willing to advance discrimination claims. The Court invalidated discriminatory state acts, 14 9. See, e.g., BREST, supra note 6, at 371, n.67 ("The Court did intervene in some egregious instances."); OWEN M. FISS, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF (1996) (discussing race and class bias in prosecution of domestic violence).
11. COLE, supra note 8, at 159. It is always dangerous to claim that there are "no reported cases" on a question of law, but my research assistant and I looked, and we, like many other researchers, could find none. The closest may be People v. Harris, reversing a conviction and remanding for a new trial on the ground that the defense should have been presented to the jury. 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1961) . Yick Wo may have had influence below the level of reported cases. It is a near-certainty that criminal defendants have won selective prosecution motions that were not appealed, or, after filing strong motions, got spectacular plea deals or judicial or prosecutorial dismissals on pretextual grounds.
12. See, e.g., FISS, supra note 9, at 309 (noting that the Court "left Yick Wo on the books but denied it any operative effect"); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 354 (1997) ("Research has uncovered no cases . . . in which a court has ruled that, on grounds of racial discrimination, a prosecutor has abused his discretion."); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1539-40 (1981) ("It says something about the wide berth the judiciary has given prosecutorial power that the leading case invalidating an exercise of prosecutorial discretion is the nearly century-old decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins. . . . Yick Wo was the first and last time the United States Supreme Court struck down a prosecution for the invalid selection of a target.").
13. Int'l Bhd. including in criminal cases. 15 The judicial attitude was undoubtedly hostile, and there were too few lawyers advancing the claims of AfricanAmericans and other people of color, but even such significant disadvantages cannot explain a complete absence of cases.
Nor is it the case that the lack of an effective remedy is overdetermined by the nature of prosecutorial discretion. Although imperfect, the McDonnell Douglas 16 and Batson 17 regimes both smoke out some discrimination and have not rendered impossible either the operation of the labor market-inevitably a highly discretionary institution-or the jury system. 18 This essay offers a new explanation: Yick Wo has never been applied to invalidate a conviction based on racially selective prosecution because the Court did not hold that prosecuting an individual because of his race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although that principle is the law now, that meaning was imposed on the case after Brown v. Board of Education. 19 In the context of the jurisprudence of the era, Yick Wo was understood to mean, and meant, something completely different.
The facts of Yick Wo are simple and dramatic. The San Francisco ordinance at issue prohibited operation of a laundry in a wooden building "'without first having obtained the consent of the board of supervisors. '" 20 This consent was in addition to health and fire inspections required by other law. When the ordinance became effective, the city's laundry operators made their applications. Of 320 laundries, 310 were in wooden buildings and therefore subject to the law; of these, 240 were operated by Chinese. 21 Applying a regulation with no standards and offering no explanation, the board rejected all petitions from Chinese laundry operators and granted all but one of the other applications. 22 Yick Wo and Wo Lee laundered without licenses and were criminally prosecuted. They were jailed after conviction of misdemeanors. Wo Lee lost his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal circuit court; 23 
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Court, and won. The men, the Court said, had been arbitrarily deprived of their property interest in earning a living. 25 The first problem with the general understanding of Yick Wo is that it was not fundamentally a criminal case. The wrong was done by civil authorities who were enforcing invalid regulations that affected what the Court considered vested constitutional rights. Logically, such a precedent might be inapplicable to law enforcement authorities pursuing valid criminal prosecutions. And so the cases held. Part I of this Article describes a body of cases, largely forgotten for the past thirty years, holding Yick Wo inapplicable to criminal cases. These cases refused to consider claims of discriminatory prosecution, even in principle, because Yick Wo prohibited states only from punishing those engaged in lawful businesses; Yick Wo did not mean that criminals the state could lawfully sanction had a defense because other criminals went unprosecuted. In 1941, the California Attorney General Earl Warren won an often-cited expression of the principle in the California Court of Appeals, which held: "[T]he only possible application of the doctrine of the Yick Wo case to a criminal prosecution would appear to be in an instance where a person was under prosecution for the commission of some otherwise harmless act which ordinarily had not theretofore been treated as a crime."
26 Part I explores the rise and fall of this doctrine.
27
Part II examines the Yick Wo decision itself and proposes that it did not turn on race.
28 Part II proposes further that Yick Wo rested on the conclusion that the laundrymen had been arbitrarily deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest. This conclusion shaped the import of the decision in two ways. First, Yick Wo had no necessary application when a property interest was not implicated. Second, once the decision is understood to be based on protecting property, the race of the person arbitrarily deprived of his property becomes irrelevant. That is, the Constitution does not provide that Chinese people, or people of color, may not be deprived of property without due process of law. Nor does it provide that members of one race may not be deprived of property without due process of law if members of another race are allowed to enjoy their property. Instead, the Constitution provides that no one may be deprived of property without due process of law, regardless of the treatment of members of the same or other races. Thus, if Yick Wo had been white, African-American, or a corporation, unjustified deprivation of property without due process of law would not have been any more or any less unconstitutional.
While Yick Wo discussed the Equal Protection Clause at length, that language turns out to be an artifact of the era's due process jurispru- dence. 29 All due process violations, the Court explained, were automatically also equal protection violations because others were allowed to pursue their occupations and retain their property. The equal protection discussion was simply another way of saying that Yick Wo's property had been taken without due process of law. Yick Wo's later career makes clear that it is a nonracial decision. 30 The Court invoked Yick Wo to invalidate regulations constituting invidious economic classifications among businesses and corporations. Yet, the Court permitted many kinds of racial discrimination notwithstanding Yick Wo.
Even as a noncriminal, nonracial, non-equal protection (at least in the modern sense) decision, Yick Wo could still be significant if it held that Chinese people were entitled to the same or similar constitutional protection of their economic rights as were others. However, Yick Wo held no such thing. Instead, as Part III explains, the Court explored Yick Wo's property rights only after carefully demonstrating that a treaty and a federal statute protected Chinese economic activity.
31
Without the treaty, Yick Wo would have lost. 32 In subsequent cases where the Court found the treaty inapplicable, it rejected equal protection arguments, consistently upholding race-based economic discrimination against Asians until the late 1940s.
Instead of being a landmark, Yick Wo is mundane. It holds that states must comply with valid and applicable treaties, hardly a controversial principle. On this basis, federal law protected Yick Wo's economic rights. Once he had federally protected rights, they could be taken away only after due process of law, again, not a new idea, even in 1886.
The Article concludes by exploring the possible doctrinal implications of the traditional misreading of Yick Wo. 33 Yick Wo appears in many of the modern cases establishing the contours of judicial evaluation of claims of discriminatory prosecution. It is a classic token, illustrating that such claims are not impossible. Because the case was decided on other grounds, it proves no such thing. Perhaps the Court's repeated invocation of Yick Wo is makeweight; the doctrine would have the features it does even if no defendant ever has or ever could satisfy its requirements. On the other hand, perhaps the Court intends to have an extremely restrictive standard, yet one that could be satisfied in an extreme case. If so, recognition of the erroneous understanding of Yick Wo warrants reconsideration of the doctrine. As Randall Kennedy explained, 34 the misconduct in Yick Wo was performed by civil administrators, not police or prosecutors. There was no discussion in Yick Wo about law enforcement conduct; all the responsibility was placed on the discriminatory San Francisco board of supervisors. 35 The statistical data the Court analyzed was about license grants and denials, not arrests or prosecutions. 36 For all that appears, the police and prosecutors impartially charged all who violated a law that was discriminatorily administered by someone else.
In addition, the case was about something innocent, doing laundry, in (or at least on the cusp of) an era where the Court believed the Constitution robustly protected economic rights. This Court recognized a substantive due process right "to earn [a] involved "a business harmless in itself and useful to the community," while here "the business is not one that any person is permitted to carry on without a license, but one that may be entirely prohibited or subjected to such restrictions as the governing authority of the city may prescribe"); Yee Gee v. City & County of S.F., 235 F. 757 (N.D. Cal. 1916) (enjoining an ordinance strictly limiting hours of work in laundries); In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229, 233 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (invalidating an ordinance requiring permission of neighbors to operate a laundry: "[H]e has, under the pledge of the nation, the right to . . . follow any of the lawful ordinary trades and pursuits of life, without let or hindrance from the state . . . , except such as may arise from the enforcement of equal and impartial laws. His liberty to follow any such occupation cannot be restrained by invalid legislation of any kind; certainly not by a municipal ordinance that has no stronger ground for its enactment than the miserable pretense that the business of a laundry-that is, of washing clothes for hire-is against good morals or dangerous to the public safety"); Ex parte Sing Lee, 31 P. 245, 247 (Cal. 1892) (invalidating a laundry ordinance: "It is very clear to us that the right of an owner to use his property in the prosecution of a lawful business, and one that is recognized as necessary in civilized communities, cannot be thus made to rest on the caprice of a majority or any number of those owning property surrounding that which he desires to use"); see also Royall v. Virginia, 116 U.S. 572, 583 (1886) (stating that an attorney has a "constitutional right" to practice professionally without compliance with unconstitutional licensing provision).
39 equal protection of the law was extended to persons of a particular race to enable them to engage in a lawful business on a basis of equality . . . . While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission of crime. . . . The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society. . . . Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime. 53 Other jurisdictions agreed. The Colorado Supreme Court, emphasizing the benign nature of the laundry business, held Yick Wo inapplicable "to those enterprises which, because of their very nature, are likely to become destructive of good morals and the peace and order of society." 54 Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court explained that "[h]ere, the nature of the operation in question is illegal, and the applicable statute leaves no room for the exercise of any discretion as to whom it may af- Ah Sin implied that upon appropriate proof, the defense would be available. But perhaps the reference to the "lawful and legitimate" nature of Yick Wo's conduct limited the doctrine. As the defense was rejected on the facts, perhaps the statement was dicta; as the crime was mere gambling, perhaps the doctrine, even if available, would be limited to trivial offenses.
In Edelman v. California, 68 a vagrancy case, the Court implied that "systematic or intentional discrimination" 69 would be a defense in a criminal case, but again, the offense was a misdemeanor, and thus did not necessarily resolve application of the defense to serious crimes. Moreover, because the Court found that the defense had not been preserved for review as a federal question, 70 the implication that the defense existed could always be dismissed as dicta.
The turning point was 1961. In that year, the Supreme Court decided Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley.
71
Two Guys upheld denial of an injunction against alleged discriminatory enforcement of Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law. The Court reasoned that anyone charged "may defend against any such proceeding that is actually prosecuted on the ground of unconstitutional discrimination."
72
Two Guys made clear that in at least some cases, discriminatory prosecution would be a criminal defense, not just give rise to a damages claim or warrant an injunction requiring prosecution of other offenders.
A year later, the Court decided Oyler v. Boles, 73 upholding West Virginia's habitual criminal sentencing law. As the Supreme Court consolidated the doctrinal developments following Brown, the Court explained how the new tiered scrutiny would apply to discriminatory prosecution claims. Although the Court found that the defense was not proved, it applied a modern understanding of equal protection:
[S]ome selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics . . . might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, relig- ion, or other arbitrary classification. Therefore grounds supporting a denial of equal protection were not alleged.
74
The Court cited Yick Wo and the civil equal protection case of Snowden v. Hughes 75 with a "cf." and the parenthetical "by implication," implying that the cases fell short of dictating the holding. The Court threaded the needle, holding that the law could police racial or religious discrimination while disclaiming any obligation to monitor other forms of selective enforcement, such as that based on a defendant's record. Yet because the defense was available in cases of race discrimination, even to habitual criminals, any contention that it was limited to trivial offenses became untenable. Once again, the skeptic could call Oyler just more dicta, but the Court seemed to be making a point.
Oyler v. Boles was decisive.
76
Later in 1962, one commentator noted: "It seems clear from the Court's language in Oyler that it has implicitly rejected the assertion of some state courts that the principle of Yick Wo would never apply to render discriminatory enforcement a defense to a criminal prosecution. 94 We note again its statement that the remedy for unequal enforcement of the law "does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society." We also find that the Montgomery case has since been consistently followed and applied in California. 
98
As Dean Benno Schmidt has observed, "The bulk of the opinion sounds in unconstitutional delegation"; 99 the administrator had been given arbitrary power over property rights. Similarly, Professor Thomas Joo explained in a landmark article that Yick Wo is an early example of, or precursor to, the substantive due process jurisprudence of the Lochner era, using the Fourteenth Amendment to protect economic rights.
100 Earl Maltz also recognized that Yick Wo cannot be regarded as a modern case that happened to be decided in 1886.
101
Of course, even then the Court allowed some regulation, even of lawful pursuits. Thus, in Soon Hing v. Crowley, 102 the Court denied habeas corpus relief to a San Francisco laundryman who was locked up for washing clothes after 10:00 p.m. within city limits. Under the ordinance, no laundry could operate without a fire inspection and a health inspection; even with these, it could not operate after 10:00 p.m. or before 6:00 a.m. The Chinese claimed that the rules were designed to put them out 97. Argument for Appellant and Plaintiff in Error at 3-6, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Nos. 1280, 1281) (assignments of error were: (1) engaging in the laundry business is a natural right; (2) restriction of those in wooden buildings is a bill of attainder; (3) the ordinance deprives launderers of property without due process of law; and (4) the ordinance is discriminatorily applied in violation of the civil rights laws, the Equal Protection Clause, and treaties with China of business. But, said the Court, the law was not facially discriminatory, and the Court regarded mandated rest periods as "beneficent and merciful," 103 although a skeptic might say that with friends like these, the Chinese did not need enemies.
But the ordinance in Yick Wo was layered on top of the regulatory regime approved in Soon Hing accounting for legitimate health and safety concerns. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the new requirement of board consent was about something else. The ordinances at issue in Yick Wo conferred "not a discretion to be exercised upon a consideration of the circumstances of each case, but a naked and arbitrary power . . . . The power given to them is not confided to [the supervisors'] discretion in the legal sense of that term, but is granted to their mere will."
104 "[T]he very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." 105 An arbitrary denial materialized in this case: It appears that both petitioners have complied with every requisite, deemed by the law or by the public officers charged with its administration, necessary for the protection of neighboring property from fire, or as a precaution against injury to the public health. No reason whatever . . . is assigned why they should not be permitted to carry on . . . their harmless and useful occupation.
106
In addition to the due process analysis, the Court explained that the deprivation represented an impermissible classification. In this famous passage, the Court said:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. . . . No reason for [denial to the Chinese and grants to others] is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not justified.
107
Commentators understand the due process and equal protection analyses as distinct, independent justifications. Under the period's jurisprudence, however, due process and equal protection claims were not distinct: they were two sides of the same coin. 109 In this era, courts and advocates understood an arbitrary deprivation of a property right to automatically constitute a denial of equal protection as well:
110
[W]herever the power of regulation is exerted in such an arbitrary and unreasonable way as to cause it to be in effect not a regulation, but an infringement upon the right of ownership, such an exertion of power is void because repugnant to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
111
For example, unfair rate regulation means that a railroad "is deprived of the lawful use of its property . . . without due process of law . . . and in so far as it is thus deprived, while other persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits upon their invested capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection of the laws. e conclude that the act which, it is asserted repealed or amended the contract was void, because a mere arbitrary exercise of power giving rise, if enforced, not only to a denial of the equal protection of the laws, but to a deprivation of property without due process of law."); Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 699 (1899) (stating that unreasonable rate-setting legislation is "a violation of that part of the constitution of the United States which forbids the taking of property without due process of law, and requires the equal protection of the laws"), overruled by Pa. R.R. Co. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6 (1917); Yesler v. Bd. of Harbor Line Comm'rs, 146 U.S. 646, 655 (1892) ("By the . . . constitution of Washington no private property can be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. The similar limitation upon the power of the general government, expressed in the Fifth Amendment, is to be read with the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting the states from depriving any person of property without due process of law, and from denying to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. The amendment undoubtedly forbids any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty, or property, and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their rights."); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884) (Field, J.) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment "undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights").
111 Although such cases held, essentially, that an equal protection violation was another way of describing a due process violation, the excerpted passage of Yick Wo leaves room for the argument that the case broke new ground by holding that racial discrimination as a general matter "is not justified." On the other hand, the passage is also consistent with the interpretation that the discrimination was not among races, but among those granted and those denied their property rights; if so, Yick Wo is not a race case at all. A less-cited portion of Yick Wo shows that the latter interpretation is correct. 114 The ordinance, said the Court: divides the owners or occupiers into two classes, . . . on one side which are those who are permitted to pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of the supervisors, and on the other those from whom that consent is withheld, at their mere will and pleasure. And both classes are alike only in this, that they are tenants at will, under the supervisors, of their means of living. 115 The Court concluded that the problematic classification was not between Chinese and others; it was between those allowed to enjoy their rights and those not. The wrong was not invidious race discrimination, but invidious denial of property rights. Yick Wo cited an industrial licensing case that invalidated an ordinance because it permitted decision based on "enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment, and difficult to be detected and exposed."
116 Racial discrimination was no different from any other ground insufficient to warrant interference with property.
117
Later cases support the conclusion that the Court understood the prohibited classification not as between races but between those allowed and denied their property rights. In Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, the Court struck down a prohibition on opening gasworks except in specified places. 118 While the plaintiff was building a gasworks, Los Angeles prohibited it from that location without explanation. Yick Wo, the Court said, "held that although an ordinance might be lawful upon its face, and Fifth Amendment unlike the Fourteenth, has no equal protection clause . . . though we assume that discrimination, if gross enough, is equivalent to confiscation and subject under the Fifth Amendment to challenge and annulment.").
114. Thus, in American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, Justice Brown, author of Plessy, explained that taxation, an interference with a property right, could not be segregated; he upheld a business tax, but added that "[o]f course, if such discrimination were purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious, and made to depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations, or other considerations having no possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers," the tax would be invalid. 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900 apparently fair in its terms, yet if it was enforced in such a manner as to work a discrimination against a part of the community for no lawful reason, such exercise of the power would be invalidated by the courts."
119
Changing the permitted zone brought the transaction "within that class of cases wherein the court may restrain the arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the police power which amounts to a taking of property without due process of law and an impairment of property rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." 120 Unless the energy companies are considered the same as racial minorities, Dobbins shows that race plays no part in the Yick Wo principle.
Similarly, in State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 121 citing Yick Wo, the Court invalidated a statute conditioning issuance of a building permit on consent of the neighbors. Those neighbors "are not bound by any official duty, but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily . . . . The delegation of a power so attempted is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
122 Tellingly, Yick Wo is cited as authority in a Jim Crowera "pole" tax case, involving a challenge to taxes on a telegraph company's infrastructure. 123 However, it plays no role in challenges to racially discriminatory "poll" taxes, which deprived individuals of the right to vote.
124 Yick Wo does not turn on racial discrimination; it turns on deprivation of vested property rights.
III. YICK WO AND FEDERALISM
If Yick Wo is a civil, nonracial case about taking property, it could still be important if it held Chinese had property rights under the Constitution on the same basis as members of other races. In Buchanan v. Warley, the Supreme Court held that African-Americans could not be denied the right to own real property. 125 This was an important case. Buchanan was not flatly inconsistent with Plessy, but it limited Plessy's potential implications; some matters, Buchanan made clear, could not be segre- 127 However, Yick Wo's rights were protected only because he had a treaty right to a laundry license on the basis of equality with others.
128 Yick Wo's brief cited no less than four sections of this treaty. 129 Other cases show that without the treaty right, the Fourteenth Amendment standing alone did not restrain San Francisco from excluding him and all other Chinese from the laundry business; the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld laws excluding Asians from economic activity on the basis of race.
A. Yick Wo as a Treaty Case
Yick Wo arose as part of a contest between the United States and California over the power to control Asian immigration. In an effort to drive the Chinese out of California, the state and localities implemented legal innovations designed to convince them that it would be better just to leave. For example, Yick Wo was preceded by a California law prohibiting corporations from employing Chinese 130 and followed by a San Francisco ordinance simply requiring them to move away. 131 Federal courts struck down these laws on various grounds, including that they conflicted with a treaty with China granting "the same privileges, immunities, and exemptions, in respect to travel or residence as may be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation." 132 Statutes throughout the West targeted Chinese in the laundry business. 133 
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By 1886, the Court was familiar with California's efforts to eliminate the Chinese. 134 The Court recognized early on the federal interest in protecting Chinese from state mistreatment. Ten years before Yick Wo, in Chy Lung v. Freeman, 135 for example, the Court unanimously invalidated a California law allowing imposition of a high bond on ships' masters landing immigrants. The Court explained that the nation's foreign policy could not be subject to the intervention of state officials: "[A] silly, an obstinate, or a wicked commissioner may bring disgrace upon the whole country, the enmity of a powerful nation, or the loss of an equally powerful friend." 136 The country affected was no secret: "[W]e venture the assertion, that, if citizens of our own government were treated by any foreign nation as subjects of the Emperor of China have been actually treated under this law, no administration could withstand the call for a demand on such government for redress." 137 Meanwhile, a United States-China treaty came into force in 1858.
138
The 1868 amendments known as the Burlingame Treaty recognized "the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration . . . for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents."
139 In addition, "Chinese subjects visiting or residing in the United States, shall enjoy the same privileges, immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel or residence, as may there be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation." 140 A supplementary 1880 treaty provided: "Chinese subjects . . . shall be accorded all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions which are accorded to the citizens and subjects of the most favored nation."
141 Accordingly, for better and for worse, the status of Chinese had a federal character different from that of racial groups comprised mostly of citizens.
Also on the books in 1886 was section 1977 of the Revised Statutes, now 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). It provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like The Court knew the treaty well. Several years before Yick Wo, the Court issued the first in a line of decisions that would extend over many years. 145 In 1883, the Court found no jurisdiction in two habeas corpus petitions where laundrymen raised the same issues that would ultimately be decided in Yick Wo. 146 In Chew Heong v. United States, 147 Justice Harlan intricately analyzed the interaction between the treaties and implementing federal legislation. Former resident Chew Heong sought readmission to the United States even though he did not possess the special reentry certificate required for racial Chinese to cross the border. He was undocumented because he departed before the law requiring certificates came in to force. Yet, under the treaties, he was in a class of persons entitled to leave, return, and live in the United States. The Court determined that "the legislation of Congress and the stipulations of the treaty may stand together," and held the certificate requirement inapplicable to those traveling abroad when it came into effect.
148
The next year, laundryman Soon Hing raised a treaty claim in his appeal.
149
Soon Hing's author, Justice Field, was particularly familiar with the treaty. As the author of the trial court opinion in Chew Heong, he had dissented from his own reversal when that case reached the Court. 150 Field also regularly applied the treaty as Circuit Justice in Cali- 150. Under the procedure apparently applicable at the time, Field's opinion prevailed in the trial court, even though the other three judges on the panel disagreed with him.
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fornia, 151 including in laundry 152 and right-to-work cases. 153 Although he recognized the threat to civilization presented by the "vast hordes" of Asia, he frequently invalidated state measures because to the national "government belong exclusively the treaty-making power and the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, which includes intercourse as well as traffic, and . . . the power to prescribe the conditions of immigration or importation of persons. The state in these particulars . . . is powerless." 154 Given their familiarity with the treaty, it is not surprising that the Yick Wo Court did not turn first to the Fourteenth Amendment when analyzing the legal status of Chinese. Instead, the first justification for its conclusion that Yick Wo's rights "are not less" was "the treaty between this Government and that of China," which provided that the United States would seek "to secure to [Chinese in the United States] the same rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions as may be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation." 155 The Court then noted that the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to citizens. This observation was surely better than the alternative, but in this era it did not clearly imply the outcome given that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to citizens, too, and the Court had already or would soon uphold discrimination against them on the basis of race, 156 religion, 157 and sex. he only limitation upon the free ingress into the United States and egress from them of subjects of China is the limitation which is applied to citizens or subjects of the most favored nation; and as the general government has not seen fit to attach any limitation to the ingress of subjects of those nations, none can be applied to the subjects of China. . . . The detention of the petitioner is therefore unlawful under the treaty," and discussing federal civil rights statutes implementing the Fourteenth Amendment).
152. In re Quong Woo, 13 F. 229, 233 (Field, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (invalidating an ordinance requiring permission of neighbors to operate a laundry: "The petitioner is an alien, and under the treaty with China is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of subjects of the most favored nation with which this country has treaty relations. . . . [H]e has, under the pledge of the nation, the right to remain, and follow any of the lawful ordinary trades and pursuits of life, without let or hindrance from the state, or any of its subordinate municipal bodies, except such as may arise from the enforcement of equal and impartial laws. His liberty to follow any such occupation cannot be restrained by invalid legislation of any kind; certainly not by a municipal ordinance that has no stronger ground for its enactment than the miserable pretense that the business of a laundry-that is, of washing clothes for hire-is against good morals or dangerous to the public safety.").
153. Baker v. City of Portland, 2 F. Cas. 472, 475 (C.C.D. Or. 1879) (No. 777) ("This treaty having guaranteed to the Chinese the right to reside here permanently with the same privileges and immunities as the subjects of Great Britain, Germany and France, which certainly includes the right to labor for a living, if it includes anything, the state cannot, in the exercise of any of its admitted general powers, limit or deny this right.").
154 in essence a statute implementing the treaty-provided that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be subject to the same "licenses" as white citizens "and to no other." 159 "The questions we have to consider and decide in these cases, therefore," the Court concluded, "are to be treated as involving the rights of every citizen of the United States equally with those of the strangers and aliens who now invoke the jurisdiction of the court." 160 Given that Yick Wo won and that the Court invoked three sources of law-the treaty, the civil rights statute, and the Fourteenth Amendment-it is necessary to isolate the significance of each to determine what the Court really decided. It turns out, however, that there is a control group showing that the freestanding Fourteenth Amendment would not have protected Yick Wo. In a line of race cases where the only doctrinal claim was the Fourteenth Amendment, the treaty was inapplicable, and the civil rights statutes not mentioned.
Until the Brown era, when the treaty was inapplicable the Court repeatedly and unanimously upheld the exclusion of Chinese and other Asians from some businesses on the basis of race, notwithstanding the Equal Protection Clause. In cases from California and Washington, the Supreme Court upheld racial restrictions on land ownership or possession. On the Chy Lung rationale, the Court would not allow states to exclude noncitizens from all forms of productive labor, meaning Yick Wo likely had a right to work in a laundry owned or operated by someone else. Citing Yick Wo, Truax v. Raich 161 held that aliens enjoy "the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community"; any other rule would bring states "into hostility [with] exclusive federal power . . . to control immigration." 162 However, in Clarke v. Dekebach, 163 the Court elaborated that "it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of a permitted classification."
164
One instance where "alien race" was reasonably considered, according to the jurisprudence of the era, was when those aliens were Asian. Racial restrictions on Asians were a part of federal law since 1790 when the First Congress passed, and George Washington signed, a law limiting naturalization to "free white persons." In refusing to naturalize a Japanese person in 1922, a unanimous Court explained that this was "a rule in force from the beginning of the Government, a part of our history as well 159 166 States borrowed the federal racial structure by imposing restrictions on "aliens ineligible to citizenship," particularly laws prohibiting ownership of land. "Alien ineligible to citizenship" was in this context a term of art: "While any alien is ineligible to naturalization, whatever his race, if he lacks any one of several other qualifications required for naturalization, the [Alien Land Laws] have been interpreted as applying solely to those 'ineligible aliens' whose ineligibility is due to their race." 167 Such laws were, as Justice Rehnquist explained, "discrimination on the basis of race 'by incorporation. '" 168 In Terrace v. Thompson, 169 the Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a Washington State law permitting land ownership only by citizens or aliens who had declared an intention to become citizens. 170 The Court explained that it was reasonable to exclude from land ownership those whom the law prohibited from becoming citizens:
[ The Court upheld criminal enforcement of the laws, 175 their application to leases as well as sales, 176 and their application to indirect ownership, such as through securities. 177 The Court also held that in criminal prosecutions, Asians could be presumed to be foreign citizens and bear the burden of proving United States citizenship. 178 As the Court later summarized this line of cases, "although the Fourteenth Amendment extends protection to aliens as well as citizens, a state may for adequate reasons of policy exclude aliens altogether from the use and occupancy of land." 179 The adequate policy reason was racial, and because of his race, the state could, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, imprison Yick Wo if he committed the crime of owning, leasing, or otherwise controlling real property for commercial purposes. 180 The Court's determination in Buchanan v. Warley that African-Americans had a right to own land was answered the opposite way for Asians: states could prohibit it.
As late as 1948, the year of Shelley v. Kraemer, 181 a majority of the Court pointedly refused to invalidate this sort of racial discrimination. In Oyama v. California, 182 Chief Justice Vinson and five others struck California's statutory presumption that land titles acquired by U.S. citizen children were shams subject to escheat if the purchase price came from parents who were racially ineligible for citizenship. 183 As the U.S. citizen child in Oyama was six years old when he purchased his farm, the presumption that the racially ineligible parents were really in control was plausible. But only four Justices, Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge, contended that the land laws themselves constituted unconstitutional racial discrimination. Three justices insisted the presumption was valid; Justice 180. Presumably, on a federalism rationale, immigrants could not be prohibited from controlling some real property for residential purposes; if states could force them to sleep in the street, that would be tantamount to forcing them to leave. But no cases have been found suggesting that courts recognized a federal constitutional right to any degree of control over land for commercial purposes of any sort.
181. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (prohibiting judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants 188 Although the noncitizens raised equal protection claims, both cases were decided on treaty grounds. In Asakura, the Court explained:
The rule of equality established by [the treaty] cannot be rendered nugatory in any part of the United States by municipal ordinances or state laws. It stands on the same footing of supremacy as do the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States. It operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts.
189
It was in this sense that the Yick Wo Court ruled discrimination "in the eye of the law, is not justified." 190 The law was the treaty, and conduct prohibited by paramount federal law, no matter how sensible as a matter of logic or policy, "is not justified." 186. 278 U.S. 123 (1928). 187. Id. at 128-29 ("Giving to the terms of the treaty, as we are required by accepted principles, a liberal rather than a narrow interpretation, we think, as the state court held, that the terms 'trade' and 'commerce,' when used in conjunction with each other and with the grant of authority to lease land for 'commercial purposes' are to be given a broader significance than that pressed upon us, and are sufficient to include the operation of a hospital as a business undertaking; that this is a commercial purpose for which the treaty authorizes Japanese subjects to lease lands.").
188. 197 The Court's language suggests that it believed firm resolution of the "Chinese Question" was not just reasonable, but urgent. The unanimous Chae Chan Ping Court, for example, noted the "well-founded apprehension-from the experience of years-that a limitation to the immigration of certain classes from China was essential to the peace of the community UNIVERSITY 210 If a classification may constitutionally appear on the face of legislation, there is Supreme Court authority that administrators can engage in the same classification. 211 Therefore, these decisions directly suggest that prosecutors could engage in the same race-based policy judgments as the legislators did in Pace, and could, for example, use their limited resources to focus on prosecuting interracial fornication if they concluded that those prosecutions would be most beneficial to the community.
Pace, Yick Wo, and Chae Chan Ping were unanimous decisions with an overlapping majority. 212 The composition of the Court had changed by the time of the seven to one decision in Plessy, but there is no reason to think the views of the justices were dramatically different. It strains credulity to think that the Justices' views on the general reasonableness of racial classifications switched, as a group, without comment, from approval in 1883 to categorical rejection in 1886, and back to approval in 1889, 1893, and 1896. It is much more plausible that Yick Wo was part of the otherwise consistently racist jurisprudence of the Justices who participated in it, and its outcome is fully explained by the property and federalism doctrines upon which it explicitly relies.
C. Legislation with Discriminatory Purpose
A distinct reason for Yick Wo's irrelevance involves racial discrimination that the Court refused to police. The design and application of criminal law is a potentially important tool for effectuation of any policy objective, including racial discrimination. Today, it is a fatal defect if a criminal law is enacted for the purpose of targeting a suspect class. 213 At the time of Yick Wo, it was not a problem; if the legislative history showed that a facially neutral statute targeted African-Americans, it was not, on that basis, invalid.
In Soon Hing v. Crowley, 214 for example, a laundry case decided the year before Yick Wo, the challengers alleged that the ordinance "was adopted owing to a feeling of antipathy and hatred prevailing in the city and county of San Francisco against the subjects of the emperor of China resident therein, and for the purpose of compelling those engaged in the laundry business to abandon their lawful vocation, and residence there, and not for any sanitary, police, or other legitimate purpose." 215 Too bad, said the Court: "[T]he impossibility of penetrating into the hearts of men and ascertaining the truth, precludes all such inquiries as impracticable and futile."
216 But there was a deeper objection: "[E]ven if the motives of the supervisors were as alleged, the ordinance would not be thereby changed from a legitimate police regulation, unless in its enforcement it is made to operate against only the class mentioned; and of this there is no pretence." 217 Similarly, in Williams v. Mississippi, 218 the Court upheld a death sentence imposed by an all white jury, even though the jury was selected from electors under a provision of the Mississippi Constitution designed to disenfranchise African-Americans. The Mississippi Supreme Court had acknowledged this purpose: "Within the field of permissible action under the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution, the convention swept the circle of expedients, to obstruct the exercise of suffrage by the negro race."
219 "But," said the U.S. Supreme Court, "nothing tangible can be deduced from this." 220 The laws "do not on their face discriminate between the races, and it has not been shown that their actual administration was evil, only that evil was possible under them." 221 Thus, even where an overt racial classification would have been unconstitutional, discriminatory motivation for a facially neutral law created no legal problem. Soon Hing was important not only because the Court held that discriminatory motives for enactment were beyond scrutiny, but also because it was irrelevant that the law applied not to the City and County of San Francisco as a whole, but only to a designated area: "All persons engaged in the same business within the prescribed limits are treated alike and subjected to similar restrictions."
222 This is consistent with the general principle that it is permissible to have different legal regimes in different parts of a state, 223 but notable when applied to the racial context. It is perfectly permissible, it appears, to have laws applicable only to particular neighborhoods, so long as everyone, regardless of race, creed, or color, who came to the attention of the police in Chinatown, the South Side, or El Barrio is prosecuted equally.
The Supreme Court approved some explicit racial classifications and gave free rein to invidiously designed and structured substantive criminal law. Accordingly, a racist legislature or prosecutor could discriminate effectively without selectively applying facially neutral laws. These decisions are important for three reasons. First, they may explain the absence of more Yick Wo-type cases; discrimination could be built into the law itself. Second, the decisions reflect a general tolerance of racial discrimination militating against the idea that Yick Wo or any other case of the era constituted an aggressive attack on racial discrimination in one particular context. Third, even if Yick Wo created strong antiracist doctrine, it would have been cynical doctrine, offered knowing that it would be evaded using techniques described and approved by the Court.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT DOCTRINE
Because the government conduct infringed a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, Yick Wo simply sheds no light on the authority of prosecutors or police to punish those violating valid laws. Because the group at issue was granted rights by treaty, the opinion simply sheds no light on the permissibility of racial discrimination when the state law did not directly conflict with federal law. Failure to appreciate the Asian context of Yick Wo has led to substantive error. Yick Wo is no evidence that the Plessy-era Court sometimes got the law right. Instead, Yick Wo is entirely consistent with the other jurisprudence of the era: [T] here is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees fit for all or any part of its territory. . . . If every person residing or being in either portion of the State should be accorded the equal protection of the laws prevailing there, he could not justly complain of a violation of the clause referred to. For, as before said, it has respect to persons and classes of persons. It means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and under like circumstances."). 228 where the Supreme Court set a high standard for a defendant claiming discriminatory prosecution to discover information about prosecutorial decision making. The Supreme Court said that its standard did not make a selective prosecution claim "impossible to prove. . . . [W]e invalidated an ordinance, also adopted by San Francisco, that prohibited the operation of laundries in wooden buildings. The plaintiff in error successfully demonstrated that the ordinance was applied against Chinese nationals but not against other laundry-shop operators."
229 But if Yick Wo was not a discriminatory prosecution case, then there are no examples of successful challenges to discriminatory prosecution.
It is unclear how important Yick Wo's role as an example is to the Court's jurisprudence; was it a partial basis for decision, or merely an observation? Perhaps it is unimportant for them to have a test that might smoke out discriminatory prosecutions. If so, a test that never grants relief is as good as one that exceedingly rarely grants relief. On the other hand, the Court has recognized an obligation "to eliminate the taint of racial discrimination in the administration of justice."
230 Perhaps this sentiment was accurate. If so, recognizing that Yick Wo has very different contours than is commonly understood warrants a reexamination of the doctrine. 
